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Abstract
We analyze a monetary model with ﬂexible labor supply, cash-in-
advance constraints and seigniorage-ﬁnanced government deﬁcits. If
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labor is greater than
one, there are two steady states, one determinate and the other inde-
terminate. If the elasticity is less than one, there is a unique steady
state, which can be indeterminate. Only in the latter case do there
exist sunspot equilibria that are stable under adaptive learning. A
suﬃcient reduction in government purchases can in many cases elimi-
nate the sunspot equilibria while raising consumption/labor taxes even
enough to balance the budget may fail to achieve determinacy.
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1 Introduction
There has been considerable interest in the issue of indeterminacy in both
theoretical and applied macroeconomics. The distinctive feature of inde-
terminacy is that there are multiple well-behaved rational expectations (RE)
solutions to the model. These can take various forms, including a dependence
on extraneous random variables (called “sunspots”). Such solutions corre-
spond to self-fulﬁlling prophecies and have been oﬀered as an explanation of
the business cycle. Much of this recent research has focused on stationary
sunspot equilibria (SSEs) near an indeterminate steady state, a possibility
that has been examined in both extensions of Real Business Cycle (RBC)
models, incorporating externalities, and in a variety of monetary models.1 A
detailed survey of this literature is provided by (Benhabib and Farmer 1999),
which gives extensive references.
A crucial related issue is the learnability of such solutions. Suppose agents
are not assumed to have rational expectations ap r i o r ibut instead make
forecasts using a perceived law of motion with parameters that they update
over time using an adaptive learning rule, such as least squares. Can such
learning rules lead agents eventually to coordinate on an SSE? That it is
indeed possible for sunspot solutions to be learned by agents was demon-
strated by (Woodford 1990) in the context of the Overlapping Generations
(OG) model of money. (See also (Evans 1989)). Local stability conditions
for Markov SSEs in simple forward looking models were developed in (Evans
and Honkapohja 1994).2 In general it can be shown that the possibility of
such coordination depends on stability conditions for the SSE, as will be
discussed further below. It is also easy to develop examples in which SSEs
are not stable under learning. For an extensive treatment of adaptive learn-
1In nonlinear models SSEs can also exist near multiple distinct steady states or rational
deterministic cycles.
2Examples of learnable SSEs are the “growth cycles” studied in (Evans, Honkapohja,
and Romer 1998) and the “animal spirits” equilibrium provided by (Howitt and McAfee
1992). These SSEs ﬂuctuate between neighborhoods of two distinct steady states, so that
nonlinearity of the model is a crucial element.
2ing in macroeconomics, see (Evans and Honkapohja 2001), who show that
“expectational stability” (E-stability) conditions typically govern the local
learnability of SSEs, as well as other RE solutions.3
Recent work has found that in RBC type models SSEs near an indetermi-
nate steady state fail to be stable under learning; see Chapter 10 of (Evans
and Honkapohja 2001), (Rudanko 2002) and (Evans and McGough 2002).
This raises the question whether stable SSEs under learning could exist in
dynamic representative agent market-clearing models with a unique steady
state. In this paper we demonstrate that this is indeed possible using a
standard inﬁnite-horizon monetary general equilibrium model.4
We study a model where the money demand arises from a cash-in-advance
constraint, as in (Svensson 1985). Svensson’s cash-in-advance timing re-
quires that consumption must be purchased with existing money holdings
and, therefore, any unexpected rise of the price level results in consumption
losses that could have been avoided if agents had the possibility of adjusting
their portfolios within the purchasing period, as in Lucas’s cash-in-advance
timing.5 For this reason, the model studied here is now being widely used in
monetary economics.6 In these models, the price elasticity of money demand
corresponds to the labor supply elasticity of intertemporal substitution. To
assume an elasticity of intertemporal substitution greater than or equal to
one is common in RBC models. However, microeconomic estimates of this
elasticity are typically signiﬁcantly smaller than one, in the range 0.5 to 0.05;
see (Card 1994) for a survey of the microeconometric literature.
Our paper contributes to the monetary literature by providing a charac-
terization of the set of equilibria in a cash in advance model with seigniorage,
stressing the role played by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and,
in particular, by studying the stability properties of the diﬀerent equilibria
under adaptive learning. Our ﬁndings are both sharp and somewhat unex-
3In the context of one-step forward-looking univariate models, results showing the
existence of stable SSE in the neigborhood of a steady state are given in (Evans and
Honkapohja 2003b) and (Evans and Honkapohja 2003c).
4Recently, it been shown that stable SSEs can exist in the sticky price New Keynesian
models for speciﬁc interest rate rules; see (Honkapohja and Mitra 2001) and (Evans and
McGough 2003).
5See (Woodford 1994) for an extensive discussion of indeterminacy in cash-in-advance
models with Lucas’s timing.
6For example, (Nicolini 1998) shows that, if the monetary authority maximizes the
welfare of the representative agent, and agents have isoelastic preferences, then the Ramsey
policy is time inconsistent unless the price elasticity is one (the log case).
3pected. The model has two regimes and the results depend on the regime. In
the ﬁrst, characterized by an elasticity of intertemporal substitution greater
than one, there are two steady states and a continuum of rational expecta-
tions equilibria (REE) with a long-run inﬂation corresponding to the high
inﬂation steady state. The low inﬂation steady state is determinate and
stable under learning, while the other is indeterminate but unstable under
learning. In this regime, none of the SSEs near the indeterminate steady
state are learnable.
In contrast, when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less than
one, which is consistent with micro evidence, there is a unique steady state
that can be either determinate or indeterminate. When the elasticity is suf-
ﬁciently low, the steady state is indeterminate and there are nearby Markov
chain sunspot equilibria that are stable under learning. In a neighborhood of
this steady state, there also exist stationary autoregressive (AR) solutions,
depending on extraneous sunspot noise, but these are not stable under learn-
ing. These results show that requiring stability under learning redirects the
focus of analysis to a particular type of indeterminate steady state and to
particular SSEs near that steady state. The results also show that the choice
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution has important consequences in
terms of the nature of the underlying equilibria.7
When stable SSEs do exist, this raises the issue of whether economic
policy can be used to avoid them, either by eliminating the existence of SSEs
or by rendering them unstable. In our model, where government ﬁnances
expenditures through seigniorage, the natural policy variable is the level
of such purchases. We ﬁnd that for a wide range of parameter values in
which the steady state has nearby stable Markov sunspot equilibria, lowering
government purchases suﬃciently can render the steady state determinate,
making the nearby sunspot solutions disappear.
The above results all concern the case where consumption and labor taxes
are ignored. However, in Section 6 we show how the analysis can be extended
to taxes. Most of the results concerning the eﬀects of changing government
spending remain unchanged when tax rates are low; in a wide range of cases
as u ﬃcient reduction in government spending will yield determinacy. We
also consider the possibility of eliminating learnable sunspot equilibria by
7We remark that versions of the OG model with seigniorage can also lead to the two
types of regimes studied here. However, as is well known, the case of a unique indetermi-
nate steady state in the OG model corresponds to a perverse labour supply response.
4increases in consumption and labor taxes .H e r et h er e s u l t sa r em o r es u b t l e .I f
government spending is not too high, raising consumption and labor taxes can
be suﬃcient to eliminate indeterminacy and learnable sunspots. However, if
government spending is relatively high then even raising taxes suﬃciently to
achieve budget balance will fail to eradicate learnable sunspot equilibria.
2 The Model
We consider an inﬁnite-horizon representative agent economy. There are two
types of consumption goods, cash and credit goods. (Cash goods must be
paid for by cash at hand.) There is also a ﬂexible labor supply, one unit of
which produces one unit of either consumption good. The unit endowment
of time is split between leisure and labor. Both consumption goods are
perishable and there are no capital goods.




















s and ns denote cash goods, credit goods and labor supply, re-
spectively. B is the discount factor and σ>0t h ec o e ﬃcient of relative risk
aversion. That is, 1/σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The
(sub-)utilities of cash goods, credit goods and leisure are assumed identical
to facilitate investigation and presentation of the results. α is the relative
weight placed on leisure.
The household budget constraint is





Here Ms+1 and Bs+1 denote the stocks of money and bonds at the beginning
of period s +1 . Is is the nominal one-period interest rate factor on risk-free
bonds earned during period s and known at the end of period s−1. ps is the
price of goods and labor in period s. The cash-in-advance constraint (CA




8This is the Svensson timing, while Lucas’s timing would had been psc1
s ≤ Ms+1.
5We will focus on equilibria where bonds are not held. Deﬁning
ms+1 = Ms+1/ps and πs = ps/ps−1,


























−σ = α(1 − nt)
−σ.
Here E∗
t denotes the expectations of the household, conditional on time t
information, where we use the notation E∗
t to indicate that the expectations
are not necessarily assumed to be fully rational, due to adaptive learning.
When RE are assumed we will use the notation Et. With the CA constraint
holding with equality, it can be written as
c
1
t = mt/πt. (1)






where gt denotes government spending on goods. We assume that gt is an iid
random variable with small bounded support around the mean g>0. There
is also a government ﬁnance constraint taking the form
Bt+1 + Mt+1 = ptgt + ItBt + Mt.
Note that for simplicity we are ignoring taxes at this stage. We generalize
the model to include consumption and labor taxes in Section 6. If bonds are
not held in positive net amount in equilibrium, then this constraint yields





Household optimization, market clearing and the CA constraint lead to
the equations
















t = mt+1 − gt (5)
c
2
t = nt − c
1














6Note that mt+1 = Mt+1/pt, the real money stock carried forward from period
t to period t + 1, is determined at time t. Similarly, It+1 is determined and
k n o w ni np e r i o dt. Equations (3)-(7), together with (2), give the temporary
equilibrium equations determining πt,n t,m t+1,c 1
t,c 2
t and It+1 as functions of
time t expectations, the exogenous government spending shock gt, and the
previous period’s real money stock mt.
We note that the labor supply response in this model is entirely stan-







where Rt+1 = It+1/πt+1. Thus increases in the real interest rate factor Rt+1
lead to increases in current labor supply nt for any value of σ.
3 Linearized Model
Our ﬁrst step is to determine the possible steady states and then to log-
linearize the model around the steady states.9 This will enable us to ex-
amine determinacy and stability under learning through an extension of the
procedure developed in (Evans and Honkapohja 2003c).
3.1 Nonstochastic Steady States
We begin by determining the non-stochastic perfect foresight steady states
that are possible when gt = g is constant and nonstochastic. Denoting steady
state values by bars over the variables, (3)-(5) and (2) imply





¯ m =( 1 + α
−1/σ)¯ n − α
−1/σ
¯ c
1 =¯ m − g
¯ π =¯ m/(¯ m − g).
These equations can be reduced to a single equation in the steady state
inﬂation rate ¯ π,
(1 − g)¯ π =1+gA¯ π
1/σ, (8)
9When the shocks are suﬃciently small, determinacy and stability under learning of
stochastic equilibria can be examined through linearization. See Chapters 11-12 of (Evans
and Honkapohja 2001) for this methodology in basic nonlinear forward-looking models.
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Figure 1: σ<1
where A =( 1+α1/σ)B−1/σ > 1s i n c eα>0a n dB < 1.
For g = 0 there is a unique steady state π =1 . F o rg>0, it can be
seen that the model has two regimes, depending on σ.I f σ<1, then the
right-hand side of (8) is a convex function, while the left-hand side deﬁnes
a straight line and there are two cases. If g>0i sb e l o wat h r e s h o l dv a l u e ,
depending on α,σ and B, there are two distinct steady states, 1 < ¯ πL < ¯ πH,
while if g exceeds this threshold there are no perfect foresight steady states.
Below this threshold value, increases in g raise ¯ πL and lower ¯ πH.T h eσ<1
regime is standard in seigniorage models. However, this model also has a
less familiar regime that arises when σ>1. In this case the right hand side
of (8) is concave, and provided 0 <g<1 (which we assume throughout the
paper), there is a unique steady state ¯ π. In this regime increases in g raise
¯ π. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the two cases σ<1a n dσ>1.
3.2 Linearization





t+1)−σ] about a nonlinear function of future inﬂation
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Figure 2: σ>1
and consumption of the cash good, see equation (3). When the model is log-
linearized for analysis of indeterminacy and learning, we must decide on the
formulation that will be used and there are two natural possibilities. First,




t+1)−σ. Under this assumption the model can be
reduced to a bivariate system in inﬂation and consumption of the cash good
(or equivalently employment). Second, it is possible to derive a univariate
reduced form from (2)-(7) and conduct the analysis with the univariate form.
In what follows, we adopt the latter formulation for theoretical simplicity.
Not surprisingly, both formulations deliver identical results.10














− gt,( 9 )
where A =( 1+α1/σ)B−1/σ is as in equation (8). To obtain this equation,
we have in eﬀect assumed that agents understand, and when forecasting
10The results for the bivariate formulation are available on request.
9make use of, the CA and seigniorage relations (1)-(2).11 (9) is the univariate
formulation that we will employ. Let gt = g +ˆ ut,w h e r eˆ ut is now assumed
to be white noise with mean zero.





tzt+1 + ut, (10)
w h e r ew eh a v ei n t r o d u c e dt h en o t a t i o nzt =l o gc1














Note that β0 < 0 while β1 ≷ 0 ⇔ σ ≶ 1. We make the regularity assumptions
that β0 6=1 ,β1 6=0a n dβ0 + β1 6= 1. In deriving (10) we have made the
assumption that current exogenous, but not current endogenous variables,
are known when expectations are formed.12 T h i ss t r i k e su sa st h em o s t
natural assumption within the univariate framework, but we will comment
on an alternative assumption below. (Under RE, knowledge of the exogenous
and predetermined variables is equivalent to knowledge of all endogenous
variables, but this equivalence does not hold under learning.)
We next assess the determinacy of the steady state and consider the
diﬀerent types of REE using the linearized model (10).
3.3 Noisy Steady State and AR Solutions
The method of undetermined coeﬃcients can be used to show that the log-
linearized reduced form (10) has RE solutions taking the form of “noisy
steady states,”
zt =( 1− β0)
−1ut. (11)
These solutions are often called minimal state variable (MSV) solutions in
the terminology of (McCallum 1983) and are the solutions most typically
a d o p t e di na p p l i e dw o r k .
11Again, these assumptions are made for theoretical simplicity. They are not imposed
in our later numerical simulations of the multivariate nonlinear model under learning.
12Knowledge of aggregate c1
t is equivalent to knowlege of the current price level and
inﬂation rate.
10If the steady state, around which we have linearized the model, is deter-
minate then, as is well known, this is the unique stationary solution near the
steady state. See, for example, (Blanchard and Kahn 1980), (Farmer 1999)
and (Evans and Honkapohja 2001). On the other hand, if the steady state
is indeterminate there exist SSEs in a neighborhood of that steady state.13
The possibility of modeling business cycle ﬂuctuations as SSEs has been
emphasized by (Cass and Shell 1983), (Azariadis 1981), (Farmer 1999) and
(Guesnerie and Woodford 1992). The following result is easily veriﬁed:








¯ ¯ > 1.
This follows since, under RE, (10) is equivalent to the standard one-step
forward-looking model zt = β1(1−β0)−1(Etzt+1+ut) studied e.g. in (Farmer
1999). Some intuition for the indeterminacy condition in the Proposition is
provided by noting that it requires strong feedback from expectations to the
current value of the endogenous variable. As is well known, strong expecta-
tional feedbacks are needed for the existence of self-fulﬁlling prophecies.
A familiar feature of the seigniorage model is that in the case of two
steady states the high inﬂation equilibrium is indeterminate. As we will see
in Section 4.2, this result also holds in our model. In addition, it can be
shown that for some parameter values we have indeterminacy in the regime
σ>1 when there is a single steady state. In fact we have:
Corollary 2 In the case σ>1 the steady state in the monetary model is
indeterminate when σ is suﬃciently large.
This result can be seen as follows. First note from (8) that limσ→∞ ¯ π =
(1 + 2g)/(1 − g), implying that limσ→∞ ¯ c1 =( 1− g)/3. Second, we have
limσ→∞β0 = 0 and limσ→∞β1 = −2. With these values the condition in
Proposition 1 is satisﬁed.
In the case of Figure 1, the two steady states ¯ πH and ¯ πL have the following
determinacy properties:
13The terminology “regular” and “irregular” is often used synonymously with “deter-
minate” and “indeterminate.”
11Corollary 3 In the case σ<1 the high inﬂation steady state ¯ πH is indeter-
minate and the low inﬂation steady state ¯ πL is determinate.
T h er e s u l ti sp r o v e di nt h eA p p e n d i x .
We next consider the form of SSEs in cases of indeterminate steady states.
Using the method of undetermined coeﬃcients one can show that there exist
stochastically stationary solutions of the form
zt = a + bzt−1 + d0ut + d1ut−1 + kηt, (12)
where ηt, the sunspot variable, is an arbitrary (observable) exogenous variable
satisfying Etηt+1 = 0. Computing conditional expectations under (12) and
substituting into (10), it is seen that the REE of the form (12) consist of the
steady state (with a = b = d1 = k =0a n dd0 =( 1− β0)−1)o rac o n t i n u u m
with a =0 ,b =( 1− β0)/β1, d1 = −β
−1
1 and d0, k free. For convenience we
will refer to the latter as autoregressive (AR) SSEs, though they also include
moving average dependencies on the intrinsic disturbance. This is the type of
solution that is emphasized by much of the applied indeterminacy literature,
see e.g. (Benhabib and Farmer 1999). For the case at hand, when the steady
state is indeterminate, there are stationary AR SSEs. Stationarity stipulates
that |b| = |(1 − β0)/β1| < 1, which holds precisely when the steady state is
indeterminate, see Proposition 1.
Although the AR solutions are the form of SSEs that have recently re-
ceived the most attention, the literature has also drawn attention to the
existence of solutions generated by ﬁnite state Markov solutions. We next
show that this type of solution can exist in our monetary model.
3.4 Markov Sunspot Solutions
When a steady state is indeterminate it follows from the theoretical literature
that there will also exist SSEs around the steady state for which the sunspot
p r o c e s si saM a r k o vc h a i nw i t haﬁnite number of states; see (Chiappori,
Geoﬀard, and Guesnerie 1992) for the case without intrinsic shocks. We will
call such solutions Markov SSEs to distinguish them from the AR SSEs dis-
cussed above. (Evans and Honkapohja 2003c) examine the relation between
these two types of SSEs in the basic one-step forward looking model without
intrinsic shocks.
For simplicity, we focus on SSEs driven by a 2-state Markov chain. Thus
assume that st is a two state exogenous process, taking values st =1o r
12st = 2. The transition probabilities are pij,j=1 ,2, so that p12 =1− p11
and p21 =1− p22. Let P =( pij). We look for solutions of the form:
zt = z(j)+Kut if st = j.




[pj1z(1) + pj2z(2)], and K =( 1− β0)
−1,
of which the ﬁrst equation can be rewritten in the vector form
θ = T θ,w h e r eθ




A Markov SSE θ exists if there exist 0 <p 11 < 1a n d0<p 22 < 1a n d
θ 6= 0 for which θ satisﬁes the equation (13). Note that if an SSE exists then,
in our linearized model, kθ is also an SSE for any real k for the same transition
probabilities, so that the “size” of the sunspot ﬂuctuations is indeterminate.
Formally, SSEs exist if and only if T −I is singular for some 0 <p 11,p 22 < 1.
Noting that T depends on p11 and p22,w ec a ns o l v et h ee q u a t i o n
det(T (p11,p 22)) = 0
and make use of the fact that P is a 2−dimensional transition probability
matrix. In linearized models such as the current one, SSEs exist only for
very particular transition probabilities, namely those for which
β1
1−β0 is the
inverse of an eigenvalue of P.S i n c e P has one eigenvalue equal to 1 and








¯ > 1, i.e. the steady state
is indeterminate, we always have existence of Markov SSEs. The required
condition on P can be thought of as a resonant frequency condition that
makes possible the excitation of the SSE.14
4 Stability Under Learning
We now take up the question of stability of the RE solutions under adaptive
learning rules. In the case of indeterminate steady states we separately assess
14For other transition probabilities the matrix T is nonsingular and the equation θ = T θ
has only the trivial solution θ =0 , which corresponds to the steady state.
13each of the three types of solution for their stability under learning. Least
squares and related learning dynamics have been widely studied and shown to
converge to the usually employed REE in many standard models. This is true
of the stationary solutions of, for example, the Cagan model of inﬂation, the
Sargent-Wallace IS-LM-PC model, the Samuelson overlapping generations
model and the real business cycle model. A recent overview of the literature
is provided in (Evans and Honkapohja 2001).
The starting point for analysis of learning is the temporary equilibrium
in the model, given by equation (9) or its linearization (10). To complete the
description of the agents’ behavior we must supplement this equation with a
rule for forecasting the required state variables next period. The agents are
assumed to have perceptions about the (in general stochastic) equilibrium
process of the economy. This is usually called the perceived law of motion
(PLM) and depends on parameters that are updated as new data become
available over time. At each period t, agents form expectations by making
forecasts using the estimated PLM. This leads to a temporary equilibrium,
called the actual law of motion (ALM), which provides the agents a new data
point of the key variables. Estimated parameters are updated in each period
according to least squares and the new data. The issue of interest is the
stability under learning of some rational expectations solution, i.e. whether
the estimated parameters of the PLM converge to REE values over time.
It is well known that, for a wide range of models, stability under least
squares learning is governed by E-stability conditions. See the (Evans and
Honkapohja 2001) book for an extensive discussion of these concepts and
analytical techniques. The E-stability conditions are developed as follows.
For given values of the parameters of the PLM one computes the resulting
ALM, and E-stability is then determined by a diﬀerential equation in notional
time in which the parameters adjust in the direction of the ALM parameter
values.
We provide E-stability conditions for the diﬀerent REE in the general
linear model (10). These results extend (Evans and Honkapohja 2003c) to
models with intrinsic shocks and by including the E∗
tzt term, which arises
under our information assumptions. We remark that the stability results
in our linearized monetary model are unaﬀected if instead full t−dating of
expectations is assumed.
144.1 Steady State and AR Solutions
Consider the noisy steady state solutions (11). These solutions exist whether
or not a steady state is indeterminate. We outline the technique for deter-
mining stability under learning for this simple case. For other cases details
are relegated to the Appendix.
Agents have a PLM of the form
zt = a + Kut.
Note that, like the steady state REE, the PLM is a linear function of the shock
and it naturally incorporates an intercept since log-linearization around the
steady state was done only for analytical purposes. Under adaptive learning
agents are assumed to estimate a and K by recursive least squares.
Given estimates at and Kt in period t, the temporary equilibrium is then
given by (10) with E∗
t zt = at+Ktut and E∗
tzt+1 = at. The question of interest
is whether at → ¯ a,Kt → ¯ K as t →∞ ,w h e r e¯ a =0 , ¯ K =( 1− β0)−1 is the
REE. The answer is that convergence is governed by E-stability.
To determine E-stability one assumes expectations E
∗
t zt = a + Kut,
E∗
tzt+1 = a, based on the above PLM, for an arbitrary a and K (intuitively, at
and Kt evolve asymptotically slowly under adaptive learning). Substituting
these into (10) the implied ALM takes the form
zt =( β0 + β1)a +( β0K +1 ) ut.
This gives rise to a mapping T(a,K)=( ( β0+β1)a,1+β0K), and E-stability




=( β0 + β1)a − a,
dK
dτ
=1+β0K − K (14)
where τ is virtual or notional time. (Note that this is simply a partial adjust-
ment formula in the virtual time.) Clearly, the general stability conditions
for (14) are β0 + β1 < 1a n dβ0 < 1.
Consider next the AR SSEs. Agents are assumed to have the PLM (12)
and to make forecasts based on the estimated PLM. E-stability conditions
are derived in the Appendix. Collecting the results together, we have:
15Proposition 4 For the general linear model (10) we have:
(i) the E-stability condition for the noisy steady state is
β0 + β1 < 1 and β0 < 1;
(ii) necessary conditions for E-stability of the AR SSEs are
β1 < 0 and β0 > 1.
Intuition for the steady-state E-stability condition (i) is fairly straight-
forward. Under this PLM, agents are estimated the mean of the process.
If β0 + β1 > 1 then estimates of the mean that are higher than the steady
state value will be revised upward, i.e. away from the equilibrium value. In
essence too much positive feedback from expectations to current endogenous
data destabilizes the system. The additional requirement β0 < 1i sn e e d e d
because the PLM also depends on the exogenous shock ut. We omit the more
elaborate intuition that could be developed for (ii).
We remark that the E-stability condition in (i) is not the same as the
determinacy condition. The condition in (i) of Proposition 4 can be examined
numerically for diﬀerent values of the parameters in the monetary model.
Recalling that β0 < 0a n dt h a tσ>1 implies β1 < 0, we have:
Corollary 5 For the linearized monetary model if σ>1 t h eu n i q u es t e a d y
state is E-stable irrespective of its determinacy/indeterminacy.
When σ<1 and there are two steady states we have:
Corollary 6 For the linearized monetary model if σ<1 the steady state ¯ πL
is E-stable and the steady state ¯ πH is not E-stable.
This result follows directly from the observation that β0 + β1 > 1a t¯ πH
and β0 + β1 < 1a t¯ πL, which is shown in the proof of Corollary 3 in the
Appendix.
Using part (ii) of Proposition 4, we get:
Corollary 7 The AR SSEs are not E-stable in the linearized monetary model.
We remark that in related models, the AR paths can in some cases be E-
stable. See, for example, the monetary OG model of (Duﬀy 1994).
164.2 Markov Solutions
Finally, we consider the Markov SSEs. Suppose that in addition to the shock
ut, agents observe a sunspot st satisfying the resonant frequency condition
and that they consider also conditioning their actions on the values of the
sunspot. A simple learning rule is that agents run least squares regressions on
the sunspot state and ut. Agents then make forecasts using these estimates
and the transition probabilities for the observed sunspot (these probabilities
can also be estimated if they are unknown).15 The stability of SSEs under
adaptive learning depends upon the corresponding E-stability condition and
we now examine E-stability of the Markov SSEs. In the Appendix we discuss
the deﬁnition of E-stability for this set-up. The results are:
Proposition 8 The E-stability conditions for Markov SSEs in the general
linear model (10) are β0 < 1 and β0 + β1 < 1.
We remark that the E-stability conditions for the Markov SSEs are iden-
tical to those for steady states and the intuition is analogous. The key
feature of E-stable Markov SSEs is that they arise in the neighborhood of a
indeterminate steady state that is stable under steady state learning. The
phenomenon of SSEs inheriting E-stability properties of nearby steady-state
solutions arises more generally, see (Evans and Honkapohja 1994) and Chap-
ter 12 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001).
Corollary 9 In the linearized monetary model we have: (i) if σ ≥ 1 and
t h es i n g l es t e a d ys t a t e¯ π is indeterminate, the Markov SSEs are E-stable and
(ii) if σ<1the Markov SSEs near an indeterminate steady state are not
E-stable.
Part (i) of Corollary 9 follows at once by noting that σ ≥ 1 implies β1 ≤ 0
while always β0 < 0. Part (ii) follows from noting that σ<1 implies
β1 > 0 and then indeterminacy requires β0 + β1 > 1, which contradicts the
E-stability condition in Proposition 8.
15In terms of the original nonlinear model, an alternative learning procedure would be
for agents to directly estimate the mean of π
−1
t+1(c1
t+1)−σ conditional on the current sunspot
state st. In the simulations below we adopt this alternative scheme when examining the
nonlinear model numerically. The stability properties of the two approaches appear to be
identical.
17We now give a numerical example of a Markov SSE satisfying the resonant
frequency condition in the linearized model.
Example of a Markov SSE: Suppose that B =0 .95,α=1 ,σ =3 .5a n d
g = .19.16 The steady state is indeterminate: β1/(1−β0)=−1.2408. There
are Markov SSEs with, for example, p11 =0 .1041 and p22 =0 .09, and these
SSEs are stable under learning.
Two important remarks must be made at this point. First, it is possible
for a steady state to be stable under learning and at the same time for nearby
SSEs to be stable under learning. When this occurs, the solution to which
the economy converges depends on the form of the PLM, i.e. on whether or
not agents in their learning allow for a possible dependence on sunspots.
Second, the results of this section are subject to the qualiﬁcation that
our linearized monetary model has been derived from an underlying non-
linear model. Therefore, we investigate the existence and stability of SSEs
directly for the original nonlinear model using numerical computations and
simulations when σ ≥ 1.
There are several important diﬀerences between the nonlinear system (2)-
(5) and the linearized system (10) with respect to the Markov SSEs. In the
linearized system the resonant frequency condition (equation (21) in the Ap-
pendix) must be satisﬁed exactly and the “size” of the SSE is indeterminate,
as earlier discussed. In the exact nonlinear system there are Markov SSEs
for transition probabilities close to the resonant frequency condition and the
value of equilibrium is in part determined by these probabilities. This is-
sue is fully analyzed for the univariate forward looking model in (Evans and
Honkapohja 2003b). Thus, although the linearized model is convenient for
obtaining existence and stability conditions for Markov SSEs, it is important
to establish further details using the nonlinear model.17
Consider, therefore, the learning dynamics in the original nonlinear model




16We have not tried to obtain the parameter values by calibrating the model to data,
since our main goal is to provide numerical illustrations.
17We remark that, with σ>1, indeterminacy of the steady state does not imply the
existence of deterministic cycles, which is in contrast to the monetary OG models analysed
e.g. by (Grandmont 1985) and (Azariadis and Guesnerie 1986). The numerical example
above does not have 2−cycles. Thus these SSEs are not local to pure cycles. However,
pure cycles exist for some other parameter conﬁgurations (details are available on request).
18Because the sunspot variable is assumed to be ﬁrst-order Markov, the con-
ditional expectation of this variable depends only on the current state. A
simple learning rule is thus to estimate the mean value of Xt+1 conditional
on the current sunspot state at t, e.g. by state contingent averaging:





i =1 ,2, where #Ni(t) denotes the number of data points in which st− −1 = i
for 1 ≤   ≤ t.T h u sa g e n t sa tt i m et estimate the mean value that Xt+1 will
take, next period, as ˆ Xi,t, when the sunspot in period t is in state st = i,
i =1 ,2.18 Accordingly they form expectations at t as E∗
t Xt+1 = ˆ Xi,t.O v e r
time the estimates ˆ Xi,t are revised in accordance with observed values of Xt
following each of the two diﬀerent states.
Under adaptive learning the model consists of these learning dynamics
together with the equations (2)-(7). We remark that under this formulation
the realized value of Xt depends on both E∗
tXt+1 and E∗
t−1Xt because πt
depends on both mt+1 and mt. From the numerical results for the linearized
model, we anticipate convergence to a stationary sunspot solution, for tran-
sition probabilities close to satisfying the resonant frequency condition, when
σ>1 and the steady state is indeterminate.
We have simulated the nonlinear system and the corresponding E-stability
diﬀerential equation using the parameter values from the above example.
Figure 3 illustrates convergence to the sunspot equilibrium for the choice of
transition probabilities p11 =0 .07 and p22 =0 .05 and initial conditions near
the steady state. (The vertical axis shows deviations of ˆ X1 and ˆ X2 from
the steady state value of ¯ X and the initial deviations were ˆ X1 = ¯ X +0 .01
and ˆ X2 = ¯ X −0.01). The simulation clearly shows convergence to a Markov
SSE. In this SSE the ratio of output in the two states is n1/n2 =1 .11 and
expected inﬂation E∗
t πt+1 in the two states are 1.20 and 2.86.
The results of this section show that, in the case in which σ>1a n dt h e
steady state is indeterminate, endogenous ﬂuctuations due to expectational
indeterminacy are a real concern. For exogenous sunspots near the resonant
frequency, rational expectation SSEs exist and are stable under simple learn-
ing rules. These considerations raise the question of whether policy is able
to avoid such expectational volatility.
18Because in the nonlinear model agents at time t make only one-step ahead forecasts
of Xt+1, it is unnecessary to directly estimate the dependence of Xt on gt.







Figure 3: Convergence of adaptive learning to sunspot solution
5 Changes in Policy
We have seen that in this model there are two steady states, ¯ πL and ¯ πH when
σ<1a n dg>0. There has been much discussion of the issue of whether
the economy might converge to the indeterminate steady state ¯ πH in related
seigniorage models. While we do take seriously the potential economic in-
stability of the economy due to the multiplicity of equilibria in this case,
we believe that the primary concern in this case is divergent paths (with πt
increasing beyond ¯ πH to unsustainable levels) if for some reason πt escapes
from the basin of attraction of ¯ πL. Reductions in g tend to stabilize the econ-
omy in this case, making convergence to ¯ πL more likely. Fiscal constraints
on deﬁcits and debt can also play an important role. The stability results
of this and other papers suggest that ¯ πH and SSEs near ¯ πH are not locally
stable under learning, though divergent paths are a concern.19
However, a new case appears in our model of seigniorage ﬁnance. In the
case σ>1 there is a unique steady state that can be determinate or indeter-
minate and for σ suﬃciently large it will necessarily be indeterminate. For
values of σ>1 the (noisy) steady state is stable under steady state learn-
ing. Furthermore, if the steady state is indeterminate and agents condition
their actions on an exogenous sunspot near the resonant frequency, then they
19The standard seigniorage model under learning was ﬁrst studied by (Marcet and
Sargent 1989). The role of ﬁscal constraints is discussed in (Evans, Honkapohja, and
Marimon 2001).
20will converge to a noisy Markov SSE. Can policy help avoid the endogenous
ﬂuctuations which can arise in this case?20
That this is indeed possible is shown by the following result (see the
Appendix for a proof):21
Proposition 10 Assume that σ>1 and consider the determinacy of the
unique steady state ¯ π for diﬀerent values of g.
(i) If σ<2, there exists a critical value ¯ g>0 such that the steady state ¯ π is
determinate if g<¯ g and indeterminate if g>¯ g.
(ii) If (1+α1/σ)B−1/σ(σ−2) >σ , the steady state ¯ π is indeterminate for all
g>0.
By Corollary 9, part (i) of Proposition 10 also implies that E-stable Markov
SSEs are eliminated by suﬃcient reductions in government spending g.N o t e
that if α ≥ 1 then for σ ≥ 4 all positive values of g are consistent with stable
Markov SSEs.
The results of Proposition 10 are illustrated in Table 1. We set α =1a n d
ﬁx the discount rate at B =0 .95. For each value of σ we examine the impli-
cations of diﬀerent choices of g. Table 1 shows that for a substantial range
of values for σ, endogenous ﬂuctuations depending on extraneous sunspot
variables can be avoided by decreasing government purchases g suﬃciently.
TABLE 1: Critical values of g for α =1 .
σ 1.1 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 3.7 3.9 ≥ 4
g 0.359 0.341 0.267 0.190 0.118 0.053 0.029 0.006 0
¯ π 16.89 4.39 2.56 1.84 1.44 1.175 1.091 1.018 1
For each value of σ reported in Table 1, a critical value of g is reported,
together with the associated value of the steady state inﬂation rate. At the
stated or larger values of g the steady state is indeterminate, there exist
Markov SSEs, and these SSEs are stable under adaptive learning. For lower
values of g the steady state becomes determinate and SSEs near the steady
20Avoidance of endogenous ﬂuctuations is a major concern in the design of interest-rate
rules for monetary policy; see (Evans and Honkapohja 2003a) for a survey.
21These results are similar in spirit, but diﬀerent in detail, from those obtained for the
monetary OG model by (Grandmont 1986). The latter emphasizes policy to eliminate
cycles, and thus the SSEs that are associated with cycles in the OG model.
21state no longer exist. For any σ in the range 1 <σ<4 stable Markov SSEs
exist for high values of g but not for suﬃciently low values. In this region
a reduction in g can bring about a double beneﬁt by both reducing steady
state inﬂation and eliminating SSEs.22
In the model of this paper we have focussed on the seigniorage case
in which government purchases are ﬁnanced entirely by printing money.
Seigniorage models have been used most commonly as a potential expla-
nation of hyperinﬂation, and our numerical example indeed emphasized the
possibility of endogenous ﬂuctuations arising at high levels of inﬂation when
the level of seigniorage is large. It is immediate from Table 1, however, that
stable Markov SSEs near indeterminate steady states can also arise at low
levels of inﬂation. We have made no attempt to calibrate the model to ac-
tual economies, and this would only be more appropriate with more elaborate
versions of the model. However, the theoretical results of this paper show
that monetary models of this type indeed have the power to explain business
cycle ﬂuctuations.
6E x t e n s i o n : T h e M o d e l w i t h T a x e s
In this section we show that the introduction of consumption and labor taxes,
while it raises revenues to ﬁnance government expenditures, does not change
the qualitative features of the previous analysis, although it introduces non




s be the consumption and labor tax rates in period s.T h e
household budget constraint becomes
Ms+1 + Bs+1 ≤ Ms + IsBs + ps(1 − τ
n













The eﬀective marginal tax rate on labor income, τ, is the relevant tax
for our analysis. This is the fraction of additional labor income taken away,
22These results are quantitatively, but not qualitatively, sensitive to the choice of α.F o r
example, for α<1 determinacy can be obtained, with suﬃciently low g, for values of σ
less than an upper limit that now exceeds 4.













Keeping the same notation as before, let
ms+1 = Ms+1/ps(1 + τ
c
s), bs+1 = Bs+1/ps(1 + τ
c
s),





We can now rewrite the household budget constraint as



















































−σ = α(1 − τt)
−1(1 − nt)
−σ.
Similarly, the government ﬁnance constraint is











s + gs = ns, this can be expressed as










ds = gs − τsns (16)
is the period s ﬁscal deﬁcit. As before, if bonds are not held in positive








23Household optimization, market clearing and the CA constraint lead now
to the equations





















t = mt+1 − dt (18)
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The non-stochastic perfect foresight steady states are a generalization of the
model without taxes. We set expenditures and tax rates to be deterministic
constants, i.e., gt = g,υt =1a n dτt = τ. Steady states are determined by
the following equations,






¯ m =[ ( 1 − τ)+α
−1/σ(1 − τ)
1/σ]¯ n − α
−1/σ(1 − τ)
1/σ
d = g − τn
¯ c
1 =¯ m − d
¯ π =¯ m/(¯ m − d).
These equations can be reduced to a single equation in the steady state
inﬂation rate ¯ π,





The earlier analysis clearly applies when τ is suﬃciently small.
More generally, it is seen that there are two steady states when σ<1
and τ<g .In contrast, for σ>1 there is always a unique steady state for all
values of τ. This follows from (19) since then the right-hand side is a concave
function of ¯ π if the quantity in square brackets is positive and a decreasing
function of ¯ π otherwise. The comparative statics with respect to g are as
before. For changes in the tax rate τ, the comparative statics are clear-cut
when σ>1: increases in τ will reduce the unique steady state inﬂation rate.
However, for σ<1 the comparative statics are in general ambiguous.
24To analyze determinacy and stability under learning, we require the full
dynamic system. Assuming that tax rates are constant over time at rate
τs = τ, the equations (18), together with (15), (16) and (17) can be combined




t+1,g t,g t+1),g t), which
has a linearization taking the same form (10) as before, but with coeﬃcients
β0 and β1 that now also depend on τ. Details are given in the Appendix.
The methods developed earlier can be applied to consider diﬀerent types
of questions concerning setting of taxes τ. We focus on the case unique steady
state (σ>1), for which we earlier demonstrated that stable Markov sunspot
equilibria can arise. When also σ<2 it was shown above that suﬃcient
reductions in g will eliminate these sunspot solutions. This raises the natural
question whether the same strong result can be obtained by suﬃciently big
increases in taxes. In particular, will determinacy of the steady state obtain
when taxes are set to achieve budgetary balance in the mean?
Before addressing this issue we must check that it is feasible to balance
the budget by increases in τ. This is indeed true when σ>1a n dt h e r ei s
au n i q u ec h o i c eo fτ which achieves budget balance. Setting d = 0 implies










which clearly has a unique solution 0 <τ b < 1s i n c e0<g<1. The
Appendix gives the values of β0 and β1 when τ = τb and we study the
question numerically.
TABLE 2: Critical values of g in balanced budget case for α =1 .
σ 1.1 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 3.7 3.9 4
g 0.712 0.735 0.678 0.564 0.400 0.198 0.111 0.022 0
It turns out that the balanced budget requirement is insuﬃcient to guarantee
determinacy and avoidance of learnable sunspot solutions. For this balanced-
budget case Table 2 gives the critical values ¯ g such that indeterminacy and
existence of learnable sunspots occurs for g>¯ g. Comparing to Table 1, it is
seen that the balanced-budget requirement does, however, raise the level of
g that is possible before running into indeterminacy with learnable sunspots.
The ﬁnding that imposing budget balance using distortionary taxes does
not eliminate indeterminacy is in itself not new: (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
251997) showed a similar result in the context of the standard Real Business
Cycle model. However, sunspot solutions in the RBC model with taxes are
almost never stable under learning, as shown by (Evans and McGough 2002)
and (Rudanko 2002). Our novel and intriguing result is that stable sunspot
equilibria under learning can emerge when the budget is balanced through
distortionary taxes instead of a reduction in government spending.
7 Conclusions
Indeterminacy of equilibria has been a major issue in both business cycle
analysis and monetary economics. Most of the applied research has examined
the question of the existence of self-fulﬁlling ﬂuctuations in a neighborhood
of an indeterminate steady state. This paper has imposed the additional
discipline of asking whether there exist RE solutions, of this type, that are
stable under adaptive learning dynamics. If solutions are not learnable, they
may well be just theoretical artifacts. On the other hand, if they are sta-
ble under learning dynamics, then agents could plausibly coordinate on such
solutions. We remark that, in experiments, agents appear able to condition
their expectations on sunspots if, as a group, they have previously experi-
enced ﬂuctuations driven by fundamentals. In such case, it is possible that
even once the ‘fundamental uncertainty’ vanishes, belief driven ﬂuctuations
persist (see (Marimon, Spear, and Sunder 1993)).
We have examined these issues in the context of a standard inﬁnite hori-
zon representative agent framework in which money demand is generated by
cash in advance constraints and exogenous government spending is ﬁnanced
by a mixture of taxes and seigniorage. The model allows for both cash and
credit goods as well as for a ﬂexible labor supply for which the response to in-
creased interest rates is always positive irrespective of the degree of curvature
of the utility functions.
We have shown that, for some regions of the parameter space, there do ex-
ist learnable sunspot equilibria in a neighborhood of an indeterminate steady
state. The learnable SSEs take a particular form, driven by a sunspot process
taking the form of a ﬁnite state Markov chain with transition probabilities
close to the resonant frequency property. The other types of SSEs examined
are not learnable. In our model, the case of learnable SSEs arises for the
regime in which there is a single steady state.
In many cases an appropriate change in ﬁscal policy can eliminate stable
26sunspot equilibria by rendering the steady state determinate. Achieving this
goal requires some care in the choice and magnitude of the ﬁscal instruments.
In some cases simply eliminating the government deﬁcit will be enough to
eradicate sunspot solutions. In other cases balancing the budget is in itself
inadequate and reductions in the level of government spending are required.
A Appendix: Technical Details
Proof of Corollary 3: By Proposition 1 we need to show that β0 +β1 > 1
at ¯ πH and β0 + β1 < 1a t¯ πL when σ<1.
U s i n g( 8 ) ,w eh a v ea tas t e a d ys t a t e¯ π
β0 + β1 − 1=
[(1 − g)¯ π − 1][(1 − σ)¯ π − 1]
σg¯ π
− 1.
Thus, we consider the quadratic function
f(π)=[ ( 1− g)π − 1][(1 − σ)π − 1] − σgπ.
The equation f(π)=0h a st w or o o t sπ =1a n d˜ π =( 1− σ)−1(1 − g)−1.
Clearly, β0 + β1 ≷ 1w h e n¯ π ≷ ˜ π.
On the other hand, consider the value ˘ π at which the graph of the function
1+gAπ1/σ has the tangent parallel to the straight line (1 − g)π. (Note that






If we require ˘ π to be also a steady state, we get ˘ π =˜ π and g is at a maximal
value for which steady states exist under the restriction σ<1. When g
is reduced from the maximal level, the comparative static properties of ¯ πH
and ¯ πL imply that ¯ πL < ˜ π and ¯ πH > ˜ π and thus β0 + β1 > 1a t¯ πH and
β0 + β1 < 1a t¯ πL.
Proof of Proposition 4: Part (i) was derived in the text. For part
(ii) concerning the AR solutions one starts with PLM of the form (12) and
computes that, under the PLM
E
∗
tzt = a + bzt−1 + d0ut + d1ut−1 + kηt
E
∗
t zt+1 = a + bE
∗
tzt + d1ut,
27where it is assumed that the current values ut,η t of the exogenous shocks,
but not the endogenous variable zt are in the information set for period t.
Substituting these into the linear model (10) we have
zt =( β0 + β1b)(a + bzt−1 + d0ut + d1ut−1 + kηt)
+β1a + β1d1ut + ut.
This yields the mapping from PLM to ALM, which, component by compo-
nent, is given by
a → β1a +( β0 + β1b)a ≡ Ta(a,b)
b → (β0 + β1b)b ≡ Tb(b)
d0 → (β0 + β1b)d0 + β1d1 +1≡ Td0(b,d0,d 1)
d1 → (β0 + β1b)d1 ≡ Td1(b,d1)
k → (β0 + β1b)k ≡ Tk(b,k).
Looking ﬁr s ta tp o s s i b l eﬁxed points we see that b =0o rb =( 1−β0)/β1.
If b =0 ,w eh a v ek = d1 =0 ,a =0a n dd0 =( 1− β0)−1. This corresponds
to the noisy steady state and in the determinate case this is the unique
stationary solution. If b =( 1− β0)/β1 we get d1 = β
−1
1 , a =0w h i l ek and
d0 can take any values, which is the indeterminate case. This latter class of
solutions will be stationary if |(1 − β0)/β1| < 1.
Introducing the notation T(a,b,d0,d 1,k)=( Ta,T b,T d0,T d1,T k), for E-
stability one examines the local stability of
d(a,b,d0,d 1,k)
dτ
= T(a,b,d0,d 1,k) − (a,b,d0,d 1,k)
at the REE of interest. In the indeterminate case we say that the solution
class is E-stable if the dynamics of the E-stability diﬀerential equations con-
verge to some member of the class from each nearby initial condition. For
the indeterminate case the E-stability conditions are easily seen to be β1 < 0
and β0 > 1.
Proof of Proposition 8: The PLM of the agents is equivalent to
zt = z(j)+Kut if st = j.
Given the informational assumptions the ALM is
z(j)
∗ = β0z(j)+β1[pj1z(1) + pj2z(2)], j =1 ,2,
K
∗ = β0K +1 .
28where z(j)∗ is the actual mean of zt and K∗ is the actual ut coeﬃcient,
under this PLM, if st = j.T h e T map for K i st h es a m ea si nt h ec a s e
of steady state learning and the corresponding condition for E-stability is
satisﬁed when β0 < 1. The equations for z(j) can be written in the matrix
form
θ












We remark that the T m a pi n( 2 0 )i sd i ﬀerent from T in (13), due to our
information assumption for the system under learning. However, they have
the same ﬁxed points and thus a Markov SSE exists if and only if there are
transition probabilities 0 <p jj < 1, j =1 ,2, that satisfy
1 − β0
β1
= p11 + p22 − 1. (21)
The mapping from the PLM to the corresponding ALM is here linear and
given by the matrix in (20). E-stability is determined by the stability of the
diﬀerential equation
dθ/dτ = Tθ− θ.
We need to compute the eigenvalues of T − I =( β0 − 1)I + β1P.I fλ is
an eigenvalue of T − I then we must have









=1o rp11 + p22 − 1.
I nt h el a t t e rc a s ew eg e tλ = 0 while the former yields λ = β0 + β1 − 1
implying the requirement β0 + β1 < 1. We remark that T − I always has
a zero eigenvalue as a result of the resonant frequency condition (21) and




=( T − I)θ
has a zero eigenvalue and negative eigenvalue if β0 + β1 < 1 holds and
(21) is satisﬁed. Stability of the set of Markov SSEs then follows from the
mathematical Lemma in the Appendix of (Honkapohja and Mitra 2001).
29Proof of Proposition 10: If σ>1, we have β1 < 0 while always
β0 < 0. Indeterminacy of the steady state requires β0 − β1 > 1. In general,
we have



















We couple these limits with the observations (a) ¯ π →∞as g → 1a n d( b )
¯ π → 1a sg → 0, which follow from (8).
To prove part (i), we note that lim¯ π→1 H(¯ π) < 1i fσ<2, which by
continuity and lim¯ π→∞ H(¯ π)=∞ imply the existence of ¯ g>0a sr e q u i r e d .
Part (ii) follows by noting that lim¯ π→1 H(¯ π) > 1w h e n( 1+α1/σ)B−1/σ(σ −
2) >σsince A =( 1+α1/σ)B−1/σ;s e et h ed e ﬁnition after equation (8).
Details on the Model with Taxes: We ﬁrst set τt = τ. The equilib-
rium equations (18), combined with (15) and (16), yield a univariate reduced
form, which can be expressed either in terms of c1
t or mt+1 since
(c
1
t + gt)(1 − τ + B(τ)) = mt+1(1 + B(τ)) + τB(τ).
where B(τ)=α−1/σ(1 − τ)1/σ. I nt h ec a s eo ft a x e si ti ss o m e w h a tm o r e
convenient to express the reduced form in terms of mt+1. Letting ˜ A(τ)=
(1 + α1/σ(1 − τ)(σ−1)/σ)B−1/σ,w eo b t a i n









mt+2(1 + B(τ)) + τB(τ)




The log-linearized form (22) is
˜ mt+1 = β0E
∗
t ˜ mt+1 + β1E
∗
t ˜ mt+2 + γgt+1,
where
β0 = σ
−1[1 − (1 − τ)/¯ m],
β1 = −
(1 − σ)(¯ m − (1 − τ))(1 + B(τ))
σ [−¯ g(1 − τ + B(τ)) + (¯ m(1 + B(τ)) + τB(τ))]
.




t+1,g t,g t+1),g t), the
log-linearized equations for c1
t would have the same coeﬃcients β0 and β1 on




t+1. Using the steady state relationships
of Section 3.1, it can be veriﬁed the these reduce to our earlier results when
τ =0 .











1 − τ + B(τ)
¸
and the condition for indeterminacy and existence of stable sunspots is as
above, i.e. β0 − β1 > 1w h e nσ>1.
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